A Commons for a Supply Chain in the Post-COVID-19 Era: The Case for a Reformed Strategic National Stockpile.

Policy Points Reflecting on current response deficiencies, we offer a model for a national contingency supply chain cell (NCSCC) construct to manage the medical materials supply chain in support of emergencies, such as COVID-19. We develop the following: a framework for governance and response to enable a globally independent supply chain; a flexible structure to accommodate the requirements of state and county health systems for receiving and distributing materials; and a national material "control tower" to improve transparency and real-time access to material status and location. CONTEXT: Much of the discussion about the failure of the COVID-19 supply chain has centered on personal protective equipment (PPE) and the degree of vulnerability of care. Prior research on supply chain risks have focused on mitigating the risk of disruptions of specific purchased materials within a bounded region or on the shifting status of cross-border export restrictions. But COVID-19 has impacted every purchase category, region, and border. This paper is responsive to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine recommendation to study and monitor disasters and to provide governments with course of action to satisfy legislative mandates. METHODS: Our analysis draws on our observations of the responses to COVID-19 in regard to acquisition and contracting problem-solving, our review of field discussions and interactions with experts, a critique of existing proposals for managing the strategic national stockpile in the United States a mapping of the responses to national contingency planning phases, and the identification of gaps in current national healthcare response policy frameworks and proposals. FINDINGS: Current proposals call for augmenting a system that has failed to deliver the needed response to COVID-19. These proposals do not address the key attributes for pandemic plan renewal: flexibility, traceability and transparency, persistence and responsiveness, global independence, and equitable access. We offer a commons-based framework for achieving the opportunities and risks which are responsive to a constellation of intelligence assets working in and across focal targets of global supply chain risk. CONCLUSIONS: The United States needs a "commons-based strategy" that is not simply a stockpile repository but instead is a network of repositories, fluid inventories, and analytic monitoring governed by the experts. We need a coordinated effort, a "commons" that will direct both conventional and new suppliers to meet demands and to eliminate hoarding and other behaviors.

Quality Assurance Sampling Plans in US Stockpiles for Personal Protective Equipment.

Personal protective equipment (PPE) stockpiles in the United States were established to facilitate rapid deployment of medical assets to sites affected by public health emergencies. Large quantities of PPE were introduced into US stockpiles because of the need to protect healthcare and other professionals during these events. Because most stockpiled PPE was acquired during, or immediately following, large-scale public health events, such as pandemic influenza planning (2005-20080), SARS (2003), H1N1 (2009-10), and Ebola (2014-15), aging PPE poses a significant problem. PPE such as N95 filtering face piece respirators were not designed to be stored for long periods, and much of the currently stored PPE has exceeded its manufacturer-assigned shelf life. Given the significant investment in the procurement and storage of PPE, along with projections of consumption during public health emergencies, discarding large quantities of potentially viable PPE is not an attractive option. Although shelf-life extension programs exist for other stockpiled medical assets, no such option is currently available for stockpiled PPE. This article posits stockpile quality assurance sampling plans as a mechanism through which shelf-life extension programs for stockpiled PPE may be achieved. We discuss some of the nuances that should be considered when developing a plan tailored to stockpiles and provide basic decision tools that may be used in the context of a quality assurance program tailored to stockpiled PPE. We also explore basic information by comparing and contrasting different sample size options.

Findings from an Assessment and Inventory of a Regional, Decentralized Stockpile.

Stockpiles can aid with healthcare surge that occurs after a disaster, and experts recommend that these caches be assessed at least annually to ensure supply integrity. The purpose of this study was to assess a regional stockpile to determine its viability and readiness. An assessment was performed in the summer and fall of 2016 on a regionally funded stockpile that was decentralized through a regional network of 15 local hospitals. Each supply was assessed to determine whether the correct amount was present, if it was in a safe and usable condition (ie, deployable), and whether it had expired. Stockpiled materials were categorized by the type of supply or equipment for analysis. The percent of deployable materials was calculated for each item, each category of supplies, and for the entire cache. Almost all sites (93.3%, n = 14) reported that they inventory their cache at least once a year. On average, 60.1% of each site's cache materials were present and deployable (range: 22.1%-87.5%). The best-maintained supplies included personal protective equipment (79.4% deployable) and general medical supplies (73.5% deployable). Decontamination equipment and pediatric supplies had the lowest percentages of deployability (29.0% and 37.7%, respectively). Although almost all sites claimed to assess the stockpile annually, results from this study indicate that almost half of the supplies are either missing or in an unusable condition. This not only represents wasted resources, but it could also hinder disaster response, leading to increased morbidity and mortality. Facilities may need to invest in infrastructure to maintain stockpiled materials after purchase to ensure viability.

Immunogenicity and safety of AS03A-adjuvanted H5N1 influenza vaccine prepared from bulk antigen after stockpiling for 4 years.

BACKGROUND: Stockpiling vaccine for deployment in the event of an influenza pandemic is an important mitigation strategy. A necessary aspect of stockpiling is to determine the shelf-life of the stored vaccine. METHODS: In this Phase II, open-label study we assessed the immunogenicity and safety of H5N1 A/Indonesia/5/2005 vaccine adjuvanted with AS03A. The AS03A-H5N1 vaccine was prepared from bulk antigen that had been stored for 4 years, and adjuvant that had been stored for 2.5 years. Both the antigen and adjuvant were filled in separate multi-dose vials within 4 months of use, and on the day of vaccination, the contents of antigen and adjuvant vials were mixed. Seventy-eight adults aged 18-64 years were scheduled to receive two doses of hemagglutinin-antigen (3.75µg) given 21 days apart. Antibody responses were assessed by hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) assay according to age (18-30 years, 31-40 years, 41-50 years, and 51-64 years). Reactogenicity was assessed for 7 days after each vaccination, and safety was assessed for 385 days post-vaccination (NCT01416571). RESULTS: The vaccine was immunogenic. Twenty-one days after the second dose of vaccine in the overall population, the HI seroconversion rate and seroprotection rate (SPR; titer ≥1:40) was 96.0% and 98.7%, respectively. At Day 182 after vaccination, the SPR was 76.7% in the overall population. Injection site pain was the most frequent solicited adverse event (91.0%), and no safety concerns were raised. CONCLUSION: The immunogenicity and safety observed with AS03A-H5N1 vaccine formulated with bulk antigen which had been stockpiled before vialing and administration was consistent with that previously observed with newly manufactured AS03A-H5N1 vaccine. This suggests that stockpiling bulk antigen for 4 years does not compromise the immunogenicity or reactogenicity of the vaccine.

[Modern approaches to the formation of antidote stocks at medical institutions in Russia and foreign countries].

This article analyses the approaches to the formation of specific treatment of acute poisoning in the various countries. The authors present a systematic review of scientific publications about the formation of reserves of antidote agents at medical institutions of the Russian Federation, the US, Canada, France, Spain, Greece, Norway, Czech Republic, Taiwan and Poland. A search for a variety of databases, as well as by reviewing reference lists of publications on the subject of "stockpiling antidote means". It is concluded that the antidote provision at health care institutions in different countries is insufficient. State of affairs with the formation of antidote stocks is better at hospitals of Czech Republic, France and Spain. To determine the range and volume of the stock of fixed assets necessary antidote coordination and approval of the list and the number of mandatory for every medical institution antidotes.

Oseltamivir storage, distribution and dispensing following the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak in Mexico.

PROBLEM: During an influenza outbreak or pandemic, timely access to antivirals is essential to reduce disease severity and transmission. Best practices in antiviral procurement, storage, distribution, prescription and dispensing must be followed for prompt drug delivery. APPROACH: Mexico implemented a national pandemic preparedness plan in 2006 and created a strategic antiviral stockpile. Oseltamivir powder was stored centrally in bulk for distribution to all 31 states and the capital district during an influenza outbreak. LOCAL SETTING: San Luis Potosí, in northern Mexico, was one of the states most intensely affected by the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak. RELEVANT CHANGES: The oseltamivir powder was meant to be reconstituted locally but had to be reconstituted centrally during the 2009 influenza outbreak. Doubts arose surrounding the shelf-life of the reconstituted product. As a result of these problems, the first supply of the drug reached San Luis Potosí 11 days after the influenza outbreak had begun. Furthermore, dispensing criteria at the state level had to be changed in conformity with the availability of oseltamivir. LESSONS LEARNT: Antiviral demand forecasts should be based on clearly defined distribution and dispensing criteria and decentralization of some of the medication stockpile should be considered. Mexico's national pandemic preparedness plan needs to be updated in accordance with the lessons learnt in 2009 to improve strategic stockpile management and ensure rapid delivery of oseltamivir to the population.